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UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL, SPRING 2006

Philosophy and Common Life: Pyrrhonism and the Anthropological
Crisis of Modernity
—Roger Eichorn
“This world, where much is to be done, and little known…”
—Samuel Johnson
Is it possible to find genuine meaning in one’s culture when faced with overwhelming evidence that all cultural
conventions are arbitrary and relative? I call this the anthropological crisis of modernity.
The crisis can be traced back to the sixteenth-century intellectual revolutions that gave rise to the modern
world. In a sense, the liberal intellectual tradition of the past four centuries has been playing out the
consequences of Michel de Montaigne’s essays, which argue that law, custom, and beliefs are culturally relative.
A great deal of that tradition consists of attempts to defeat Montaigne’s skeptical relativism, as though it were
the enemy. It is my contention, however, that skepticism, that is, doubt concerning ultimate truth and ultimate
reality, is above all constructive. It is not the enemy. In fact, skepticism is the only stable intellectual position.
For no matter how thoroughly a new dogmatism thinks it has defeated the “enemy,” the skeptical dragon
inevitably rises again. Given the instability of dogmatism, it is skepticism itself that provides the only stable
solution to the anthropological crisis that it is frequently charged with having created.

Skepticism's Children
Though often relegated to a footnote in the history of thought, skepticism stands front and center in all periods
of profound cultural and philosophical development. In the ancient world, Plato’s philosophy was a reaction
against the nihilistic skepticism of the Sophists (1). The late Richard Popkin spent his distinguished career
uncovering the role skepticism played in the emergence of the modern world. His research shows how
skepticism underwrote the Protestant Reformation and laid the groundwork for the break with Aristotelian
Scholasticism and the rise of the “new science” in the seventeenth century. “Voltaire later said that [Pierre]
Bayle [the ‘supersceptic’] provided the arsenal of the Enlightenment” (2). At the dawn of modernity, René
Descartes set out to defeat Montaigne’s skepticism in his Meditations. Descartes’s philosophy was hugely
influential in shaping the modern mind, but most contemporary philosophers would agree with Popkin’s
characterization of Descartes’s solution to the skeptical crisis as a “heroic failure” (2). A few centuries later,
inspired by the skepticism of David Hume, Immanuel Kant attempted to permanently overthrow the doubts of

the skeptics in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s Critique changed the face of Western philosophy
forever, but it too failed to answer the skeptical challenge.
Without first having been awoken from his “dogmatic slumber” by the work of David Hume, Kant never would
have written his Critique. Without the skepticism of Montaigne, Descartes never would have written his
Meditations. Without the nihilistic relativism of the Sophists, Socrates never would have undertaken to educate
the people of Athens and Plato never would have developed the elaborate metaphysical system that is seen as
the headwaters of the Western philosophical tradition. So much is philosophy indebted for its proudest
monuments to the persistent challenge of skepticism!
Despite the influence and sheer analytic virtuosity of philosophers such as Plato, Descartes, and Kant, no one
has successfully refuted skepticism. A dogmatic philosophy might withstand the skeptical barrage for a decade
or a century (or, in Aristotle’s case, a millennium), but eventually it is either dismantled from within or sacked
from without. Given skepticism’s resilience, a common strategy of philosophers has been, whether innocently or
maliciously, to misrepresent the skeptical position in order to render it unacceptable. Modern philosophical
skepticism is understood as presenting philosophy with a set of epistemological puzzles—i.e., puzzles
concerning the nature of knowledge—that philosophers must solve if they are to claim to know anything at all.
The assumption seems to be that if we cannot secure the foundations of knowledge, we must believe nothing.
As Plato has Socrates claim repeatedly throughout the Platonic Dialogues, “we must remain persuaded [by what
an argument has demonstrated] until someone shows us a better [argument]” (3). Or, more evocatively, “The
lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead” (4). It follows from Socrates's dictum that if
skepticism demonstrates that our beliefs are unjustified, we must abandon our beliefs. Many philosophers
argue, however, that since we do, by an uncontrollable necessity, believe in all sorts of things, inquiry cannot
proceed down the skeptical path. Skepticism simply must be wrong.
As Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out, this conclusion displays nothing so much as a lack of intellectual integrity.
More importantly for our purposes, it assumes that skepticism necessitates disbelief in such things as morality,
other minds, and the external world. I will show in the following section that, properly understood—that is,
understood in the Pyrrhonian sense—skepticism does nothing of the sort. In fact, it never necessitates disbelief
(as a negative judgment). Rather, it merely calls for suspension of judgment, and then only on “unclear
matters.”

Pyrrhonism
Two schools of philosophical skepticism arose in ancient Greece. The first, Academic skepticism, held that no
knowledge is possible. The best humans can do is determine the probability of a given proposition being true.
The second, Pyrrhonian skepticism (named after the semi-legendary Pyrrho of Elis, a contemporary of Aristotle)
accused the Academicians of negative dogmatism in claiming that no knowledge is possible, for surely, if the
Academicians know that no knowledge is possible, then knowledge is possible. Furthermore, if one can
determine the probability of a given proposition being true, one must possess a degree of knowledge concerning
the status of the proposition relative to competing propositions. In contrast to the Academicians, Pyrrhonians
proposed to suspend judgment on all unclear matters, including whether knowledge is possible or whether one
proposition is more plausible than another.

Since Pyrrhonism’s emergence in the ancient world, critics have argued that it would render life unlivable. The
seventeenth-century skeptic David Hume argued that external-world skepticism was psychologically impossible
to maintain. “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity, has determin'd us to judge [of the truth of
propositions] as well as to breathe and feel” (5). The logical or epistemological puzzles of the skeptic “admit of
no answer and produce no conviction,” their only result being a “momentary amazement and irresolution and
confusion” that nature swiftly brushes aside (6). The philosopher (including the Academic skeptic) may say
whatever he likes from his closet—for example, that we have no knowledge of an external world or the
existence of other minds—but common life will not spare a moment to register such revelations. As Nietzsche
wrote, “Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the effect of every meeting at which there are
speeches proves this” (7). Life blithely brushes aside such philosophical effects, as though they were of no
consequence—which, in everyday life, they are not.
For thousands of years, this argument has been presented as a refutation of skepticism. But the fact is that it
fails to contradict Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonians only suspend judgment on “unclear matters.” As Sextus Empiricus,
the main source of our knowledge of Pyrrhonism, wrote:
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense in which
some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to
the feelings forced upon them by appearances... They do not hold belief in the sense in
which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the
sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear...
Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances,
without holding opinions—for we are not able to be utterly inactive…
We coherently follow, to all appearances, an account which shows us a life in conformity
with traditional customs and the law and persuasions and our own feelings. (8)
In other words, Pyrrhonians are almost identical to the non-philosophical people who fill the ranks of common
life. The crucial difference between the two is that Pyrrhonism purges common life of prejudiced philosophies.
Thus, Pyrrhonians will not dogmatically assert the superiority of their customs over those of other cultures,
whereas dogmatists—both of the philosophical and non-philosophical variety—believe that their favored dogmas
illuminate absolute values which they can bring to bear in order to judge, praise, and condemn.

Philosophy and Common Life
In Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, Donald Livingston characterizes Hume as a “post-Pyrrhonian.” According
to Livingston, the principle difference between a Pyrrhonian and a post-Pyrrhonian lies in their relationships to
philosophy (9). The Pyrrhonian is seen as rejecting philosophy in favor of “common life,” that is, a life lived in
accordance with the laws, customs, and personal inclinations of the Pyrrhonian and his society. It is a
conservative position that casts a wary eye on all innovations. The post-Pyrrhonian, on the other hand, seeks to
reconcile philosophy and common life; he recognizes the latter to be the stable foundation that philosophy left
on its own has been unable to provide for itself. For Hume, to reconcile philosophy and common life is to pass
from “false” to “true” philosophy. False philosophy is not only ridiculous, ending in the complete absurdity that

we know nothing, but is also dangerous, in that it supports an array of metaphysico-religious prejudices (e.g., a
belief in the inherent superiority of one ethnic group over another on the grounds that one is God’s chosen
people and the other are heathens). Hume saw true philosophy as a “calm, though obscure, region” in which a
person can shelter himself from the “fury and contention” of competing superstitions (10). The true philosopher
will limit, based on his Pyrrhonism, the scope of his inquiries to an examination and ordering of the conventions
of common life. The post-Pyrrhonian recognizes that “there is no Archimedean point outside common life as a
whole from which it can be either certified or criticized” (9). Critique will remain internal.
The conservative response to the anthropological crisis of modernity is to restate the propositions under
debate—that is, to simply deny, on the authority of the traditions in question, that there is anything to debate.
Patriotism and love of one’s country, they argue, are incompatible with skeptical doubts about the moral status
of one's culture. This view ignores the role skepticism plays in times of cultural flux, such as Greece after the
Periclean Golden Age or Western Europe in the Renaissance. The twentieth and twenty-first centuries are just
such a period of transition, a process that is underway no matter what anyone has to say about it. Historically
speaking, then, such doubts are to be expected. Culturally and philosophically speaking, they are not the
destructive forces they are made out to be; they are constructive.
The question is: What will skepticism construct next (or, if you prefer, what will it cause to be constructed)? In
the periods we have considered, skepticism gave rise to dogmas that, while failing to answer the skeptical
challenge, managed to fend it off for a time by convincing people that an answer to the crisis had been found or
would be found if the path laid out by the dogmas was followed. Descartes and Kant offered just such dogmatic
systems. Given time, however, even the most elaborate dogmas collapse in on themselves. Therefore, if the
future proves to be like the past, any dogmatic solution to the skeptical crisis will be temporary. If temporary
solutions are unacceptable, then dogmatic solutions are unacceptable. That leaves us with an interesting
question: What if we don't need a dogmatic solution? What if the “skeptical crisis” isn't really a crisis at all?
What if philosophy suffers not from a skeptical crisis, but from a dogmatic crisis?

Skepticism—the Solution
It is my contention that post-Pyrrhonism offers the only stable framework for supporting cultural identity in the
face of overwhelming evidence of cross-cultural relativity and arbitrariness. As I suggested in the previous
paragraph, skepticism is only a “crisis” if dogma is thought to be necessary to support, for example, social
stability or intellectual advancement. In the same way, anthropological evidence of cultural relativity is only a
“crisis” if the existence of absolute values is thought to be necessary to secure or maintain cultural identity.
Post-Pyrrhonism shows us a way out of the anthropological crisis by denying that the information anthropology
collects is cause for a crisis. Post-Pyrrhonism does not “defeat” the crisis, in the sense that skepticism was
thought to have been defeated countless times in the past; rather, it accepts the apparent anthropological facts
while denying those facts their supposedly destructive entailments.
“The world,” Montaigne wrote, “is nothing but variety and dissimilarity” (11). When we examine the world as
anthropologists, “our reason does not find a stay and a foundation” (12). To those seeking absolute,
unchanging foundations for cultural practices, this may seem like a cause for crisis. But the authority of a
culture, according to Montaigne, lies not in absolute values, but in custom: “[W]hat all philosophy cannot
implant in the head of the wisest men, does not custom by her sole ordinance teach the crudest common herd?”

(12). We rarely recognize the arbitrariness of our own customs, often mistaking them for absolutes, because
“the principal effect of the power of custom is to seize and ensnare us in such a way that it is hardly within our
power to get ourselves back out of its grip and return into ourselves to reflect and reason about its ordinances”
(12). Viewed externally, as an empirical phenomenon, a particular culture seems no more or less justifiable
than another, but the post-Pyrrhonian will recognize and respect the internal authority of common life.
In a crucial passage, Montaigne wrote:
Whoever wants to get rid of this violent prejudice of custom will find many things accepted
with undoubting resolution, which have no support but in the hoary beard and the wrinkles
of usage that goes with them; but when this mask is torn off, and he refers to things in
truth and reason, he will feel his judgment as it were all upset, and nevertheless restored
to a much surer status. (12)
This passage may seem cryptic, but we should be in a position to make some sense of it. The only foundation
for custom is “the hoary beard and the wrinkles of usage.” When the venerable mask of usage is torn off, we
suffer the anthropological crisis—our judgment is “as it were all upset” by the unsettling outcome of referring
things to “truth and reason.” Montaigne does not abandon us in this state, however. Once we recognize that
custom is not grounded in absolutes, our judgment is “nevertheless restored to a much surer status.” We
accept cultural relativity, the absence of absolute values, but we also come to recognize the ultimate authority
of common life. Custom provides a surer foundation for cultural practices than mythic absolutes, because
absolutes inevitably crumble under the skeptical barrage, whereas customs change but never lose their
authority.
Skepticism solves the anthropological crisis by locating the foundation of cultural practices in the ultimate
authority of custom, not in any external standard or empirical regularity. “I should hate as much to see a
German putting water in his wine as a Frenchman drinking it pure,” Montaigne wrote. “Public usage lays down
the law in such things” (13). And of such things are cultures built. The price of this skeptical solution is a certain
diffidence toward alien cultures: in a word, toleration. “[W]hat is off the hinges of custom,” Montaigne wrote,
“people believe to be off the hinges of reason: God knows how unreasonably, most of the time” (12). The
authority of custom provides a stable foundation for cultural identity, but—when purged of dogmatic
philosophies—it provides no foundation for prejudice.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, holding tight to absolute values is a cause for crisis. Skepticism is the
solution.

I would like to thank Professor David Hiley and the entire philosophy department for introducing me to the
riches of our intellectual heritage.
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